"What became of General Sibley along about this time no one ever knew, but it was generally supposed that he crawled into a jug hole and pulled the jug and hole in after him." - Theophilus Noel
While waiting in El Paso at the end of his New Mexico campaign, Henry Sibley learned that Alfred S. Thurmond, the fiery Ranger captain with whom he had more than one falling out, was going to prefer charges against him for his conduct during the invasion. Specifically, he learned that Thurmond planned to accuse him of drunkenness on duty, inhumane treatment of sick and wounded soldiers, cowardice, and the misappropriation of goods confiscated at Stapleton's Ranch near Valverde. Taken aback by the disgraceful character of the accusations and fearing the notoriety of being brought before a court, Sibley appealed to William Steele for help. As commander of the 7th Regiment and Thurmond's immediate superior, Sibley believed that Steele might be willing to suppress the charges. Like Sibley, Steele was a veteran of the 2nd Dragoons and the General considered him a most intimate friend. To Sibley's chagrin, Steele refused to cooperate. Possibly in league with Thurmond from the start, Steele instead forwarded the charges to the Confederate Secretary of War, George W. Randolph. (1)
Nothing immediate came of Thurmond's allegations and soon afterwards Sibley made his way back to San Antonio. A few weeks later, the general established a new brigade headquarters at Marshall, Texas. On September 1, he received orders to report his brigade to General Richard Taylor for service in Louisiana. Throughout the rest of the month, Sibley prepared to reassemble his regiments and make the ordered move. Before the work was complete, he found himself recalled to Richmond to explain his actions in New Mexico. Luckily for his immediate career, Thurmond's charges were never fully pursued. Secretary Randolph forwarded the papers to President Davis who then turned them over to General Theophilus H. Holmes, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, with instructions that they be investigated. Holmes soon discovered that he was outranked by Sibley and turned the matter over to Major G.M. Bryan, the Trans-Mississippi's Assistant Adjutant-General. For his part, Bryan promptly fell sick with pneumonia. The result was, that for more than five months, the charges languished in bureaucratic limbo. (2)
General Sibley, on the other hand, actively went on the defensive. Having seen a copy of the charges in El Paso, he arrived in Richmond well prepared to answer their accusations. To support his position he brought along five loyal members of his staff. These included three aide-de-camps: twenty-one-year-old Captain, Thomas P. Ochiltree, 1st Lieutenant Samuel Magoffin, and 1st Lieutenant Joseph Edward Dwyer. The fourth and fifth supporters were his Chief of Commissary and Subsistence, Major Richard T. Brownrigg, and his Chief of Ordnance, Willis L. Robards. Two days after their arrival in Richmond, each of these men wrote lengthy depositions contesting the charges. In remarkably similar statements, they described their General as "cool, calm, and deliberate," and the accusations as "fallacious and disgusting." (3)
In turn, each of the charges was addressed. While acknowledging that Sibley drank, the staff officers all agreed that it had never impaired his judgment. Willis Robards wrote; Sibley was "convivial and companionable like most of the old Army officers," but that he always remained in control of himself, and, in fact, no officer "detests and loathes a drunkard more than he does." Prostrated by pneumonia, it was illness and not drunkenness or cowardice, they asserted, which kept him from the field at Valverde. Both Brownrigg and Magoffin stated that they were with the General, under fire on the battlefield, and, that they saw no evidence of cowardice. Robards called the charge, "simply absurd." Ochiltree swore, that he was with Sibley at Stapleton's Ranch and, that he took nothing for personal use. Lieutenant Dwyer cited examples of Sibley's compassion, and stated, that it was more humane to leave the wounded behind, where the Federals could care for them, than to subject them to the rigors of the brigade's retreat. (4)
A formal court-martial was never convened. While in Richmond, Sibley met with Jefferson Davis and according to sketchy details, the two men talked frankly. Davis always liked his "General of the West," and seemed to have little concern about the charges. The bulk of their meeting, it appears, was spent discussing the military and political situation in Louisiana. Thurmond's accusations and the replies of Sibley's staff shuffled back and forth between the President and the new Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon. In the end, Davis decided that the charges were not preferred through proper channels and directed that they be dismissed. "Sibley's familiarity with Richmond politics, his friendship with the president, as well as the convincing defense by the members of his staff no doubt saved him." With his reputation tarnished, but his career and status mostly intact, General Sibley weathered the storm. (5)
On December 2, 1862, orders were issued in Richmond, telling him to proceed to New Iberia, Louisiana, and resume command of his brigade. Four or five days later, Sibley left the capital and headed for the Trans-Mississippi. With Union forces in control of western Tennessee, he took a southern route through the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, crossing the river into Louisiana at Vicksburg. Christmas found him in the state's provisional capital at Opelousas. At Jackson, Mississippi, Sibley learned, that Scurry, now a general, was in command of his brigade and that it was still in Texas. The only troops waiting at New Iberia were the men of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert's Arizona Battalion. Immediately Sibley wrote to General Holmes and requested, that in accordance with the War Department's instructions, the rest of his brigade and the Valverde Battery be ordered to New Iberia at once. (6)
During their meeting in Richmond, President Davis impressed on Sibley the importance of immediate and active operations in Louisiana. Accordingly, while waiting for a response from Holmes, the General took to the field with those forces at hand. Intent on familiarizing himself with the roads, streams, and other resources of the country, around New Iberia, he kept the Arizona Battalion busy scouting and reconnoitering in the vicinity of Plaquemine and the Mississippi River. Of particular concern to Sibley was a strategic salt-works located nearby. During this period, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert made efficient and aggressive use of his men. The scouting parties were so energetic that Major James H. Bogart, in command of the small Federal garrison at Plaquemine, felt compelled to evacuate his post. Based on the movements his men observed, the Major reported to his superiors, that General Sibley was operating nearby with a large force; "at least 5,000, strong with artillery and cavalry." Bogart was later reprimanded for his hasty retreat. (7)
Other reports of Sibley's strength were closer to the mark. A Union intelligence assessment dated January 27, 1863, stated that General Sibley was in command on Grosse Tete near Indian Village with a force consisting of at least 650 cavalry, some infantry, and five pieces of artillery. Total Rebel troops in the area were placed as high as 3,000. In mid-February, a Spanish national, passing through the area, told Union forces, that Sibley had relieved Brigadier General Alfred Mouton. The Spaniard, one Benito Monfort a music teacher from Cadiz, claimed that he had dined with Sibley and that he heard the General say that he expected to soon be reinforced by 3,500 men, all mounted. (8)
The departure of Sibley's brigade from Texas was delayed by insufficient funds and a lack of transportation. When the men at last took up the line-of-march, the wet season was in full swing in the bayou country. Muddy roads and flooded streams impeded the regiments' progress and further stalled their advance. Notwithstanding, the gist of Monfort's information proved correct, and during the second week of March, 1,300 of Sibley's men rode into Opelousas accompanied by the Valverde battery. (9)
As directed by the Secretary of War in Richmond, Sibley reported his command to General Richard Taylor. Taylor, son of the late President Zachary Taylor, was preparing to defend the Bayou Teche region of southern Louisiana against the advance of a Federal army, pushing up from New Orleans. In the first days of April, General Nathaniel Banks, the Union commander of the Department of the Gulf, assembled 16,000 men at Berwicks Bay and began an advance up the Teche. (10)
Taylor and Sibley disagreed about how best to defend against Banks. General Taylor believed the Federals should be engaged at a spot called Bisland. This was a narrow neck of dry land, on the Bayou Teche between the villages of Pattersonville and Centerville. Sibley felt that the defense should be made at New Iberia, and argued that the bayou below that point was indefensible. He was right. Bisland and the dry corridor, were bordered on the east by Grand Lake and could be easily outflanked by a water landing. Any Union troops disembarking at Hutchin's Point, near Franklin thirteen miles above, would be in a position to fall upon the Confederate rear. If General Sibley's recommendation had been followed, subsequent events may have been quite different. As it was, his policy "was overruled both by Gen. Taylor and public opinion." Taylor felt Sibley was in "feeble health," and determined to make his stand at Bisland. He knew the weakness of the position, but as he put it, "to retreat without fighting was, in the existing condition of public sentiment, to abandon Louisiana." Simple breastworks were thrown up, and "Fort Bisland" was made ready to meet the Federal onslaught. (11)
Outnumbered four to one, Taylor positioned his forces in an extended line on both sides of the Bayou Teche and waited. Amidst constant light skirmishing, General Banks army closed in. On Saturday the 11th of April, 1863, the Union force commenced a serious advance. Supported by a gunboat on their right flank, the Federals drove in Rebel pickets and assumed positions facing the Confederate works. On the afternoon of the 12th, Taylor's batteries opened a brisk cannonade along the whole line, and were answered in kind by Union guns. This artillery duel continued until sundown, when the Federals fell back a few hundred yards and encamped for the night. (12)
Seeing the disposition of the enemy forces, General Taylor determined to take the initiative. Leaving a small force to hold the earthworks, he planned to attack down the west bank of the Teche at first light. The General was satisfied, that his troops, supported by a gunboat they had captured, "could drive the enemy back, throw him into confusion, and render it necessary for him to withdraw." Receiving information that the Federals had gunboats and transports moving towards Hutchin's Point, Taylor left orders for General Sibley to make the attack, and hurried towards Franklin to assess the threat to his rear. (13)
Sibley delayed. He received Taylor's instructions about 9 o'clock P.M., but took little action. His "supineness" was such, that he did not even communicate the plan to General Mouton, in command on the east side of the bayou, until after 2 A.M. General Sibley was positive, that the scheme was impractical. He decided that there wasn't enough time to make the necessary arrangements, and so he did nothing. It was a decision which would effectively end his career. When morning came, there was no attack. Returning to the front, General Taylor was shocked to discover that his orders had been disobeyed. He believed that the attack would have had "most favorable results," and was furious and disgusted with Sibley's inactivity. (14)
His own plans thwarted, Taylor watched in frustration while Banks took the offensive. As a heavy fog lifted, the Union troops began to advance slowly towards the Rebel positions. Throughout the day on the 13th, Taylor's men managed to hold the 14,000 Federals at bay. "A fierce combat was kept up until sundown," when Banks' forces withdrew and went into bivouac. At this point, General Taylor learned that the feared landing of Union forces in his rear had occurred. Immediately, he ordered a retreat. Angry at Sibley's failure and disobedience, Taylor contemptuously placed Mouton, a junior officer, in command over him and ordered Sibley to take charge of the army's commissary and supply train. (15)
It isn't known if Sibley was drinking at this point, but his judgment was deteriorating steadily. At Franklin, Taylor ordered him to assemble wagons, carts, carriages, and ambulances and transport the army's sick and wounded to New Iberia. Instead, Sibley concocted a preposterous plan to pass the convalescents, along with certain prisoners, through the Union lines on the steamboat, "Cornie,” flying a hospital flag. Federal forces controlled the passage of the Teche between Franklin and New Iberia, "and of course the boat and those on board fell into the enemy's hands." Learning about the fiasco but, too late to prevent it, Taylor characterized the plan as so idiotic as to be "unheard of." (16)
Sibley's worst blunder at Bisland was yet to come. Above Franklin the route of the Rebel retreat took a cutoff northward to avoid a great bend in the Teche. Just clear of the village it entered a small stand of trees and by means of a wooden bridge crossed a sluggish stream, called Bayou Yokely. The ground near the stream was low and bogy, and impassable for wagons except along a narrow causeway. After passing through this funnel and with Federals approaching from a point known as Harding's Lane, General Sibley became concerned about Tom Green. Colonel Green and the 5th Regiment Texas Mounted Volunteers were acting as the Confederate rear guard. Sibley was afraid that they might be cut off. Without bothering to consult with General Taylor, Sibley sent one of his staff officers to Green with orders "to fall back in haste through the town of Franklin." In obedience to the order Colonel Green immediately withdrew. At Bayou Yokely, assuming that all other troops were safely across, he set fire to the bridge. Unknown to Green, General Mouton and his infantry were still fighting a holding action at a spot known as Irish Bend. Greatly endangered by General Sibley's careless order, these troops were forced to retire across the bridge even as it burned. A moment or two more and Sibley would have caused a disaster. (17)
Totally disgusted, Major General Taylor told Sibley to go march at the front of the retreating columns. If he was useless as a field commander, at least he could act as a figurehead and prevent straggling. Even in this, Henry Sibley failed. Instead of keeping the men together and selecting a suitable campsite as instructed, Sibley took an entirely different road from that of his troops and retired from the field. When he left, he simply rode away. He didn't bother to report his intention to Taylor, nor did he pass on the Major General's instructions to the officer next in command. Keeping to the rear of the column, it was late afternoon before General Taylor discovered, that once again, his orders had been ignored. By then, "the men were straggling without order over the whole line of the march and adjacent country." Taylor immediately dispatched a note to General Sibley, requiring prompt obedience to his previous orders. No response was forthcoming, so the Major General himself eventually selected the camping ground and endeavored to collect the stragglers. Late in the evening, Sibley finally reported to Taylor in person, "stating that he was sick, and asking permission to go on the line of retreat in advance of the column." Upset, but with little alternative, Taylor granted the request. (18)
The Major General's stated object in holding on to Bisland was to win the sympathy and support of the people of Louisiana and to build confidence in his troops. The brief defense may have attained these goals, but the cost was high. Skirmishing to protect their rear, the Confederates reeled back through New Iberia. At Vermillion Bayou, the first defensible position along the line of their retreat, they fought a warm action, destroyed a bridge behind them, and temporarily halted the half-hearted Union pursuit. After this, Taylor's army fell back undisturbed. The Confederates weren't pressed closely by General Bank's, but neither could they permanently check his advance. The retreat continued past Opelousas and didn't stop until it reached Natchitoches, nearly 200 miles up the Red River. The Confederate state capital was moved to the relative safety of Shreveport, and the bayou country of southern Louisiana was lost once and for all. (19)
There is little question that General Sibley's bumbling and inept leadership were contributing factors in the decisiveness of the Confederate rout. One of General Taylor's first actions, after the successful escape of his troops, was to prefer formal charges against his incompetent subordinate. Sibley was placed under arrest, and for the fourth time in his military career, he found himself facing a court-martial. The majority of the soldiers in the Sibley Brigade were ignorant of their general's blunders and had little or no idea why he was relieved of command. Most felt, that given the numerical superiority of the Federals, the debacle at Bisland was unavoidable. "Big fish eat little fish," was one soldier's explanation of why their commander was chosen to shoulder the blame. (20)
The charges General Taylor pressed against Sibley were serious, and consisted of three counts of disobedience to orders, and two counts of unofficer-like conduct. Specifically, Henry Sibley was accused of failing to make the ordered attack on the morning of April 12, failing to evacuate the army's sick and wounded in the manner ordered, and failing to take personal command of the retreating columns. On the charges of unofficer-like conduct, he was accused of, endangering the retreat by prematurely ordering Green to withdraw, and of leaving the field for his bed, when his personal management was still required. (21)
After the rout, General Taylor's infantry moved by easy marches up the valley of the Red River. General Mouton, with Colonel Green and all the mounted men of the Sibley Brigade, swung west, to find subsistence and threaten the enemy's rear. Supplies in the area proved scarce, and to obtain sufficient quantities, the Confederate horse eventually moved to Sabine, more than 100 miles away. Concurrently on April 20th, the Federal army reached Opelousas. Unaware, that Mouton and Green were out of the game, and fearing attacks on his rear, General Banks tarried until May 5th, before moving on to Alexandria. At Alexandria, his force turned east, and crossed the Mississippi to assist in the successful Union assault on Fort Hudson. (22)
The retreat of their state government and the military headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi from Opelousas sparked considerable confusion in the Rebel bureaucracy. Further disorder was caused by the subsequent evacuation of Alexandria and the continued threat from Banks' army. Because of the unstable situation, no immediate action was taken on Taylor's charges. During the next three months, General Sibley's, fate remained in limbo. In the interim, Tom Green, who displayed conspicuous gallantry at Bisland, was promoted to Brigadier General, and handed command of Sibley's troops. The Sibley Brigade, as such, had fought it last engagement. Although the unit remained intact as a fighting force, it would henceforth be known as the "Green Brigade" or "Green's Cavalry," after its new commander. (23)
In late July, the new commander of the Trans-Mississippi, Kirby Smith, signed orders calling for General Taylor's charges to proceed. At last, on August 15th, a full five months after he was first accused, Henry Sibley had his day in court. The court-martial panel of senior officers was presided over by forty-one-year-old Major General John G. Walker, a veteran of Antietam, and included Brigadier General Thomas Green, Henry's former subordinate. As was the case with Captain Thurmond's allegations, after the New Mexico campaign, General Sibley presented a competent and successful defense. "After mature deliberation on the testimony," the court reached a "Not guilty" verdict, which was notably similar to the one reached in Henry's previous court-martial in Utah. On the first specification of the first charge, the panel found, that General Sibley, "did not display that promptness in making the necessary arrangements for the attack that he should have done, and is to that extent censurable." On the second specification of the first charge, they found the "Specification proven," that Sibley did indeed cause the sick and wounded on the steamer Cornie to fall into Federal hands. Likewise, on the third specification of the first charge they found that Sibley hadn't "done all that he should have done in conducting the retreating column, and in the selection of the camp," and that the specification was proven. Remarkably, in each case the court found there were mitigating circumstances, and "no criminality" was attached to Sibley's actions. Each failure was seen as either arising from "a train of circumstances that relieve him from the consequences of a deliberate disobedience of orders," or "from a misconception of the orders of his superior." (24)
To the displeasure of some of the local citizens and some soldiers from his old brigade, Sibley was not restored to command. Others were less concerned. Voicing a prevalent opinion, Bill Davidson wrote; "I have to say that Gen. Sibley acted well at Bisland, and he was treated badly; still he was not liked by the brigade." Although "honorably acquitted," Sibley found that the verdict did nothing to salvage his military standing. With the fortunes of the Confederacy rapidly on the wane, and available troops dwindling on a near daily basis, the Trans-Mississippi command had little use for a cavalry general of dubious ability. Unwelcome at General Taylor's headquarters with his old command, and with no other assignment available, Sibley remained in Shreveport, a general without an army. (25)
For the remainder of the war, General Sibley's fortunes continued essentially unchanged. Unwilling to assign Henry a command in Louisiana or Arkansas, General Kirby Smith wrote to Major General John B. Magruder, commanding Texas, to see if he had any use for him. When Magruder replied that he did not, Smith, apparently tired of having Sibley under foot, told him to report to Richmond. The trip to the Confederate capital proved a waste of time. Sibley arrived, during second week of February, 1864, and reported to Adjutant General Cooper. When he presented himself, Cooper appeared baffled about why he was sent in the first place. The Confederate high command was ignorant of the fiasco at Bisland and Sibley's subsequent court-martial. During his stay, the General made no effort to enlighten them. For the next six weeks he remained in the capital, while they tried to decide what to do with him. After proposing and discarding ideas for several commands, Adjutant Cooper eventually decided to send Henry back to the Trans-Mississippi to await further orders. (26)
With Union forces controlling the Mississippi, the trip from Richmond to Shreveport had become increasingly hazardous. Rather than risk the overland journey, Sibley decided to make his return by taking a steamer through the Federal blockade to Havana Cuba and thence to Matamoros, Mexico. From Matamoros, he could return to Louisiana by way of Texas. The distance from the Confederate held port of Mobile, Alabama to Shreveport was about 300 miles, the journey Sibley undertook was nearly 2,400. The plan was to say the least absurd. By contrast, Major General Taylor traveling in the opposite direction at about the same time, easily slipped across the Mississippi River, paddling a canoe within sight of Union gunboats. (27)
Sibley's odyssey took weeks if not months to complete, but with no assignments and few prospects, its length made little difference. By the time he reached Shreveport, the Confederacy was in the last year of its existence. Still without a command, Sibley could do little except wait. In July, of 1864, anticipating the approaching darkness, he passed his wife Charlotte, their daughter Helen, and their son Sidney through the Federal lines to the safety of Brooklyn. Henry remained at the headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi, and was still there, when Kirby Smith surrendered the Department on June 2, 1865. Ironically the Union officer who accepted Smith's surrender was none other than, then Major General, Edward Richard Sprigg Canby the architect of Sibley's New Mexico defeat. (28)
After the war, Henry Sibley's prospects went into more or less steady decline. Unlike many Southerners, he had no home to return to, no sources of wealth, and no profession beyond soldiering. Because he had held a rank above colonel and because he resigned his Union commission to join the Rebel army, he couldn't vote or hold political office. Between 1865 and 1889, he lived first in New Orleans and then in Brooklyn. Although he looked for suitable work or business opportunities in both places, all his attempts at employment failed. In December of the latter year, he was presented with his last great chance for success. Thaddeus Mott, an adventurer and agent for the Khedive of Egypt, was in the United States recruiting ex-army officers, both North and South, to help modernize the Egyptian military. At a meeting between Mott and General William Tecumseh Sherman, Sibley's name came up. By early 1870, Sibley was once again a general, only this time his uniform included a fez and his posting was on the banks of the Nile. As a Pasha in the Egyptian army, Sibley was given charge of the Khedive's artillery and helped to strengthen the coastal defenses at Alexandria. His tenure in Egypt lasted only three years, by which time his alcoholism became chronic. In the summer of 1873, the Khedive, who was fed up with Sibley's habitual drunkenness and incompetence, gave him a substantial severance allowance and dismissed him from service. (35)
Returning to the United States, Sibley spent several months at his wife's ancestral home in Brooklyn, and then moved to Fredericksburg, Virginia to join his daughter Helen. Fredericksburg remained his home for the rest of his life. Because of his alcoholism and ill health, he was always near destitution. He lived off the charity of his daughter, and a pittance, earned here and there by tutoring French or writing magazine articles. Ever proud and creative, he styled himself an inventor, and patented several inventions, none of which brought financial success.
His one brilliant creation, "The Improved Conical Tent" was used extensively by the Union throughout the war and the ex-general spent many of his remaining days writing letters in vain attempts to obtain royalties. By his own calculations, the army owed him $101,242.50 for the 47,541 tents it had manufactured. Because of his disloyalty, no payment was ever forthcoming. Early on, Sibley gave a half interest in the tent to a Major William W. Burns. Burns remained true to the Union and received royalties of over $100,000. Sibley was bitter and frustrated to the end of his days.
Henry Hopkins Sibley, Confederate General of the West, passed away at 5 o'clock in the morning, on August 23, 1886. Writing about Sibley's departure from his brigade in Louisiana, so many years before, Theophilus Noel penned the old general's most befitting and generous epitaph, "in bidding Gen. Sibley an adieu, we do so under the full conviction that we have parted with a high-minded, noble, valorous, and gifted officer, endowed with a principle too lofty and honorable to deign to any acts calculated to wrong anyone, let him be whom he may." (30)
Footnotes
1. Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.309-310.
2. OR,I,XV,p.843, S.S. Anderson, Assistant Adjutant-General, to Brig. Gen. H. H. Sibley; OR,I,XV,p.819, H.H. Sibley to Hon. George W. Randolph, Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.
3. Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.312-313.
4. Crist, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 8, pp.536-537; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.312-313.
5. Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, p.314.
6. OR,I,XV,p.885, Special Orders No. 282; OR,I,XV,p.913, Major A.M. Jackson to Capt. Edmund P. Turner; OR,I,XV,pp.910-911, H.H. Sibley to Lieut. Gen. T.H. Holmes.
7. OR,I,XV,pp.910-911, H.H. Sibley to Lieut. Gen. T.H. Holmes; OR,I,XV,p.197, James H. Bogart to Brigadier General Grover, See also p.240 Report of Col. Richard E. Holcomb.
8. Around February 4, 1863, Sibley ordered a company of cavalry and one section of artillery, to the Red River. A Union ram, the "Queen of the West," had slipped past the Confederate guns at Vicksburg, and was reported operating in that vicinity. The ram was attended by three smaller Rebel boats that she captured. The captured boats were reported to be lying near shore, slimly guarded, and General Sibley wanted his men to attempt their recapture. There is no report as to the outcome of the mission. The Queen herself was eventually captured, when she was disabled by the Confederate guns at Fort DeRussy. OR,I,XV,p.665, Lieutenant Colonel Sam. John Storrs to Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Irwin; OR,I,XV,p.680, Pickering D. Allen to Brig. Gen G. Weitzel; OR,I,XV,pp.1107-1108, Brig. Gen. James Bowen toLieut. Col. Richard B. Irwin; OR,I,XXIV,p.339, H.H. Sibley to Headquarters; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp.122-123.
9. Ibid, p.125; OR,I,XV,pp.968-970, James Reily to Brig. Gen. H.H. Sibley.
10. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p.9; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.319-324.
11. Noel, Campaign from Santa Fe, p.78; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p.130.
12. OR,I,XV,p388, Report of R. Taylor, Major General.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid, pp.390-392.
15. Ibid; Noel, Campaign from Santa Fe, p.78.
16. OR,I,XV,p.393, Report of Maj. Gen Richard Taylor; OR,I,XV,p.1094, Findings of a General Court-Martial in the case of Brig. Gen. H.H. Sibley.
17. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p.130; OR,I,XV,p.392, Report of Maj. Gen Richard Taylor; OR,I,XV,p.1094, Findings of a General Court-Martial in the case of Brig. Gen. H.H. Sibley.
18. OR,I,XV,p.392, Report of Maj. Gen Richard Taylor; OR,I,XV,p.1094, Findings of a General Court-Martial in the case of Brig. Gen. H.H. Sibley.
19. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p.134.
20. Noel, Campaign from Santa Fe, p.78; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, p.329.
21. OR,I,XV,pp.1094-1095, Findings of a General Court-Martial in the case of Brig. Gen. H.H. Sibley.
22. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp.134-137; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, p.330.
23. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp.134-137; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, p.330.
24. The court offered no explanation for its "Not Guilty" verdict on the 2nd charge of unofficer-like conduct. OR,I,XV,pp.1094-1095, Findings of a General Court-Martial in the case of Brig. Gen. H.H. Sibley.
25. Davidson, "Reminiscences of the Old Brigade," June 28, 1888; Noel, Campaign from Santa Fe, p.78; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, p.331.
26. Ibid, pp.332-333.
27. According to authorities in Richmond, Sibley had no authority to go to Cuba. Once there, he found himself stranded, quickly ran out of money, and became a nuisance to Major Charles Helm, the local Confederate agent. In the end, Helm was forced to loan Sibley $500 so the General could pay his debts and not become an embarrassment to the Confederate government. Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.332-333; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, p.197.
28. Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, p.335; OR,II,VII,p.438, Frederick Steele to E. Kirby Smith.
29. Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.337-357.
30. General Sibley was buried in an unmarked grave that remained so for another 70 years. Noel, Campaign from Santa Fe, p.78; Thompson, Henry Hopkins Sibley, pp.359-369.
(See The Road to Glorieta for bibliography)
